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Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem 
Kyle D. Logue* 
A tortfeasor1 who cannot fully pay for the harms that it causes is said 
to be "judgment proof." Commentators have long recognized that the exis­
tence of judgment-proof tortfeasors seriously undermines the deterrence and 
insurance goals of tort law. 2 The deterrence goal is undermined because, 
irrespective of the liability rule, judgment-proof tortfeasors will not fully 
internalize the costs of the accidents they cause. The insurance goal will 
be undermined to the extent that the judgment-proof tortfeasor will not be 
able to compensate fully its victims and that first-party insurance markets 
do not provide an adequate response.3 Liability insurance can ameliorate 
these so-called judgment-proof problems in two ways: First, if liability 
insurance is "experience rated" or "feature rated,"" the presence of such 
insurance can induce tortfeasors to take appropriate steps to prevent 
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1987, Auburn University; J .D. 
1 990, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Steve Croley, Jon Hanson, Avery Katz, Charles Silver, and 
Kent Syverud for their comments and to Marta Almli for research assistance. 
1. A "tortfeasor" in this context is a party who has been involved in an accident that results in an 
injury to another and who has some chance of being held liable in tort for causing that injury. 
2. For a discussion of the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law, see infra text accompanying · 
notes 63-64. For examples of scholarly works that address, directly or indirectly, the effects of the 
judgment-proof problem on the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law, see Steven Shavell, The 
Judgmem Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. LAW & EcoN. 45 (1986) (noting that judgment-proof parties 
do not have the appropriate incentive either to prevent accidents or to purchase liability insurance); 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, To!Wlrd Unlimiled Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 
1 00  YALE L.J. 1 879, 1882-83 (1991) (discussing the implications of judgment-proof problems that arise 
in the context of the limited liability of corporate shareholdera); John G. Fleming, Report to the Joint 
Committee of the California Legislature on Tort liability on the Problems Associated with American 
Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HAsTINas L.J. 1465, 1470 (1979) (noting the role of 
liability insurance in alleviating the judgment-proof problem); William R. Keeton & Evan Kwerel, 
ExternaliJies iJi Automobile Insurance and the Underinsured Driver Problem, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 149, 
149-50 (1984) (documenting the extent of judgment-proof-driver problems and examining their effect 
on the demand for liability insurance); John Summers, Comment, The Case of the Disappearing 
Defendant: An Economic Analysis, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 145 (1983) (noting both the deterrence 
and the insurance aspects of the judgment-proof problem). 
3. A "victim" in this context is a party who has suffered an injury as a result of an accident that 
involved another party. 
4. Insurers feature-rate when they adjust premiums to reflect the safety-level of an insured's 
activities. Insurers experience-rate when they adjust premiums to reflect the actual loss experience of 
the insured. KENNBTH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTINORISK 46 ( 1986). 
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accidents.5 Second, the presence of liability insurance increases the 
amount of assets available to compensate plaintiffs. This is because when 
a judgment-proof tortfeasor has purchased liability insurance, not only the 
tortfeasor's assets but also the assets of the insurance company can poten­
tially be used to compensate tort victims .. However, because virtually all 
liability insurance policies contain policy limits and because only some 
liability insurance policyholders have sufficient assets to cover tort 
judgments that exceed those policy limits, some liability insureds will 
nevertheless be judgment-proof. 
In his paper, Judicial limitations on the Discretion of liability 
Insurers to Settle or litigate: An Economic Critique,6 Alan Sykes identifies 
some interesting ways in which the existence of judgment-proof insureds 
affects the decisions of liability insurance companies regarding whether to 
settle or litigate claims that have been brought against their policyholders.7 
Relying on these observations, Sykes suggests that the problem of 
judgment-proof insureds provides. an argument against judicially imposed 
limits on insurer settlement discretion, such as the "duty-to-settle" 
doctrine. 8 Sykes's paper thus makes a useful contribution both to the 
literature on the judgment-proof problem and to the literature on_ the duty 
to settle.9 
This Comment first explains the judgment-proof-insured problem that 
Sykes has identified and describes how that problem bears on the debate 
S. See id. at 44 (discussing the beneficial deterrence effects of liability insurance, assuming that 
the insurer successfully classifies risks and adjusts premiums according to the insured's levels of care 
and activity); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the EConomics of liability Insurance, 1S CORNBU. L. 
REv. 313, 337-38 (1990) (suggesting reasons why liability insurers may develop expertise in accident 
avoiibnce that can be passed on to the insured); Shavell, supra note 2, at S4 (discussing how liability 
insurance can ameliorate the effects of the judgment-proof problem). To the extent liability insurance 
premiums are not linked, or are imperfectly linked, to changes in the insured's level of care and 
activity, liability insurance can, for obvious reasons, blunt the deterrence effect of tort law. ABRAHAM, 
supra, at 17, 44, 46; RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 202-03 (4th ed. 1992); 
Steven Shavell, On liability and Insurance, 13 BBU.J. EcoN. 120, 120 (1982); Stephen D. Sugarman, 
Doing Away with Tort I.aw, 13 CAL. L. REv. SSS, S14-16 (1985). For a discussion of why, at least 
in the context of products liability, liability insurance might be expected to further the deterrence goal, 
see Hanson & Logue, supra note 2, at 193 n.247. 
6. Alan 0. Sykes, Judiciall.imirations on the Discretion ofliabilily Insurers to Settle or litigate: 
An Economic Critique, 72 TEx. L. REv. 134S (1994). . 
7. Id. at 1361-63; see also Alan 0. Sykes, •Bad Faith• Refusal to Settle by liability Insurers: 
Some Implications of the Judgment-Proof System, 23 I. LEGAL STUD. 77 (1994) (providing a formal 
proof of the judgment-proof problem that can arise in duty-to-settle cases). 
8. Sykes, supra note 6, at 1363-6S. Liability insurance policies often allocate to the insurer 
unfettered discretion regarding whether to settle or litigate claims that have been brought against the 
insured. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 7 .8(a), 87S (student's ed. 
1988) (noting that a typical provision will state that the insurer "may make such investigation, 
negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient"). 
9. For a thorough discussion of the duty-to-settle doctrine and related issues, see Kent D. Syverud, 
The Duty to Settle, 16 VA. L. REv. 1113 (1990). 
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concerning judicially imposed limits on insurer settlement discretion. 
Second, this Comment expressly, if only temporarily, adopts the normative 
criterion that animates much of the judicial and scholarly analysis in the 
duty-to-settle area-that is, the policy objective of encouraging insurer 
settlement decisions that maximize the combined expected wealth of lia­
bility insurers and their insureds10-and suggests a reform proposal that 
might eliminate this judgment-proof problem. If this proposal were to 
eliminate the judgment-proof problem, it would strengthen the case for 
extracontractual limits on insurer settlement discretion in some contexts. 
Next, this Comment briefly reexamines the duty-to-settle doctrine, this time 
taking into account additional normative criteria: the deterrence and 
insurance goals of tort law. Put differently, this Comment expands the 
standard analysis of the duty to settle by taking into account how alter­
native formulations of that rule affect an important class of parties not 
privy to the liability insurance contract-namely, tort victims. Finally, this 
Comment concludes with the following question, which is intended to be 
more provocative than illuminating: Would all problems associated with 
judgment-proof tortfeasors disappear if we simply adopted a regime of 
universal, unlimited, mandatory liability insurance? 
I. The Inevitable Conflict of Interest Between Liability Insurers and 
Their Insureds 
The judgment-proof problem that Sykes has identified arises in the 
context of a well-known conflict of interest between liability insurance 
companies and their policyholders. To understand this conflict, it will be 
helpful to work through a slightly modified version of Sykes's numerical 
illustration.11 Suppose an insured is involved in an accident in which a 
third party is injured, and the victim sues the insured for $100,000 in 
damages.12 Suppose further that the insured's liability insurance policy 
covers this sort of claim, but limits the amount of coverage to $50,000. 
Assume also that the policy allocates to the insurer complete discretion 
regarding whether, and under what circumstances, to settle or litigate the 
10. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 6, at 1352 ("[Sykes's] numerical example hints that the insurer 
should be induced to accept all settlement offers that are joint-wealth-increasing, even if the insurer's 
selfish interests at the time the offer is made would lead the insurer to litigate."); see also Sykes, supra 
note 7, at 77 (suggesting that a "first-best contract" between insurers and insureds would achieve the 
joint-wealth-maximizing outcome). 
11. For Sykes's illustration of the judgment-proof problem, see id. at 1362. The principal 
modification this Comment makes to Sykes's example is the addition of two simplifying assumptions: 
that litigation costs are zero and that insureds are risk-neutral with respect to the possibility that, if the 
case were to go to trial, the plaintiff would win. If these assumptions were relaxed, as they are in 
Sykes's paper, the analysis would not change in ways that would alter the analysis of this Comment. 
12. 1n this Comment, the term "insured" refers to a tortfeasor that has liability insurance coverage. 
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claim. Next, assume that at some time after the complaint is filed, but 
before trial, an objective appraisal of the case reveals that there is a 50 % 
likelihood that a court would hold the insured liable for the full $100,000 
if the suit were tried. Thus, the expected trial judgment is $50,000.13 
Further, assume that if the court were to hold in favor of the plaintiff, the 
insured would have assets sufficient to cover the excess judgment-here, 
$50,000. In other words, assume for the moment that there is no 
judgment-proof-insured problem. Assume finally that the plaintiff makes 
a settlement demand of $40,000.14 Note how at this point the incentives 
of the insurer and the insured diverge: 
(1) If all else were equal, the insured would prefer to accept the 
settlement demand, because that demand falls within the policy 
limits, and hence is fully covered by the insurer. On the other hand, 
if the settlement were rejected and if the plaintiff were to win at trial, 
the insured would incur an uninsured liability of $50,000-the 
difference between the policy limit and the amount of the potential 
judgment. Generally, the insured would rather accept any settlement 
that is within the policy limits than try the case.15 
(2) The insurer, however, would prefer to reject the $40,000 
settlement demand and proceed to trial. Indeed, the insurer would 
rather go to trial than accept any settlement demand that is greater 
than $25,000, which is the insurer's expected cost of going to trial 
under the assumptions of the example.16 
(3) Note also that the combined expected wealth of the insurer and 
the insured would be increased by their agreement to a $40,000 
settlement demand, which is $10,000 less than the combined 
expected cost to the insurer and the insured of going to trial­
$50,000 in this example. In fact, the insurer and the insured would 
increase their combined expected wealth by accepting any settlement 
between $25,000 and $50,000. Even though the insured, to secure 
such a settlement, would be willing to contribute up to $25,000-the 
expected cost to the insured of going to trial-to the deal, the insurer 
would have a strong incentive to use its unfettered contractual 
discretion over the settlement decision to reject the $40,000 demand. 
13. The expected judgment is the product of the 50% chance of recovery and the $100,000 
anticipated judgment. 
14. I will follow the custom among plaintiffs' attorneys and claims adjusters of referring to 
settlement proposals from plaintiffs as "demands" and settlement proposals from defendants as "offers." 
Syverud, supra note 9, at 1120 n.12. 
15. This conclusion assumes that the liability policy in the example contains no deductible. 
16. The $25,000 is the product of the 50% chance of the court awarding damages to the plaintiff 
and the $50,000 anticipated judgment. 
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In general terms, therefore, a conflict of interest exists between the 
liability insurer and its insured that may induce the insurer to reject 
settlement demands that, if accepted, would have increased their combined 
expected wealth. Put differently, this conflict of interest provides insurers 
with an incentive to reject some joint-wealth-increasing settlement 
demands.17 
Most courts that have addressed this conflict of interest have re­
sponded by imposing a duty to settle on liability insurers. Although the 
precise statement of this duty varies, 18 most courts require that the insurer 
give "equal consideration" to the interests of insureds when deciding 
whether to settle or litigate a claim.19 In applying this standard, a signifi­
cant number of courts have used a formulation known as the "disregard­
the-limits" rule.20 This rule requires the insurer in settlement negotiations 
to act as a reasonable insurer would act in the absence of policy limits. As 
this standard is understood by courts and commentators, the reasonable in­
surer would, in theory, accept any settlement demand that is less than the 
expected trial judgment. 21 Applying this rule to our example, if the 
insurer had rejected the plaintiff's settlement demand of $40,000 and the 
plaintiff had won the $100,000 judgment at trial, then the insured22 would 
have been able to recover from the insurer the difference between the 
policy limits and the judgment. In the example, that difference is $50,000. 
17. An insurer makes a "joint-wealth-increasing" or "joint-weslth-maximizing" settlement decision 
when it either accepts a settlement demand that would increase, or rejects a settlement demand that 
would decrease, the combined expected wealth of the insurer and the insured. Sykes discusses two 
reasons why, notwithstanding the potential conflict of interest, the market alone might give insurers an 
incentive to accept joint-wealth-increasing settlement demands. First, insurers who reject such 
settlements will suffer reputational costs. Sykes: supra note 6, at 1353. Sykes views this reputational · 
penalty, however, as an incomplete solution at best, because information of this type might be slowly 
or inaccurately disseminated. Id. What he does not discuss, however, is the extent to which the 
reputational costs might differ depending on the type of insurance and the type of insured involved. 
For example, I would have a comparatively greater degree of confidence in the beneficial effects of 
reputation in contexts involving sophisticated commercial insureds. Cf. Syverud, supra note 9, at 1199 
(noting that because the parties to reinsurance contracts are sophisticated, an "insurer that abuses a 
reinsurer in settling cases must expect to pay for that abuse in its reputation among other reinsurers�). 
This observation strengthens the argument made later in this Comment that some type of limit on 
insurer settlement discretion might be appropriate in contexts involving commereially unsophisticated 
insureds, but not in other contexts. See infra notes 31-38. The remainder of this Comment will 
assume that reputational effects are absent. 
18. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 8, § 7.8(b)(l), at 880-83 (surveying various formulations 
of the duty-to-settle doctrine). 
19. Id.§ 7.8(b)(2), at 884; Syverud, supra note 9, at 1122. 
20. See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 61 HARV. L. REV. 
1136, 1146-48 (1954) (introducing the disregard-the-limits conception of the duty-to-settle doctrine). 
Syverud noted that, at the time of his writing, 16 states were using the disregard-the-limits formulation. 
Syverud, supra note 9, at 1122-23 n.23. 
21. If we were not assuming away litigation costs, the theoretically correct rule would be that the 
insurer should accept any settlement demand that is less than the sum of the expected trial judgment 
and the anticipated litigation costs. 
22. In states that permit assignment of duty-to-settle claims, this party could also be the tort victim. 
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II. Applying the Joint-Wealth-Maximization Goal: Should the Law 
Impose Extracontractual Limits on Insurers' Discretion to Reject 
Settlements? 
As described in the previous part, courts have in fact imposed extra­
contractual limits on liability insurers' discretion to reject settlement 
proposals. Whether the law should impose such limits is the subject of 
Professor Sykes's paper. In answering this question, Sykes first analyzes 
several market-failure rationales that might be offered in defense of judi­
cially imposed restrictions on insurer settlement discretion, restrictions such 
as the disregard-the-limits rule.23 Sykes then concludes that market­
failure rationales for limiting insurer settlement discretion are, "at best, 
uneasy. "24 Sykes then describes the judgment-proof-insured problem and 
explains how that problem provides an additional reason to be suspicious 
of judicially imposed restrictions on insurers' settlement authority.25 Part 
II of this Comment addresses the one market-failure rationale that I con­
sider a persuasive theoretical argument-albeit a less persuasive empirical 
argument-for imposing some type of limit on insurer settlement discretion. 
Part ill explains the judgment-proof-insured problem that Sykes correctly 
identifies. Finally, Part IV discusses an alternative formulation of the 
disregard-the-limits rule that may ameliorate this problem. 
Sykes asks the following question: "If restrictions on settlement dis­
cretion are such a good idea, why do insurance policies omit them?"26 
To put the same question differently, assuming restrictions on insurer 
settlement discretion are joint-wealth-maximizing and assuming insurers 
and insureds are rational,27 why do liability insurance policies in fact 
allocate unfettered settlement discretion to insurers? One response appeals 
to the concept of market failure-that is, one could argue that market 
failures prevent insurers and insureds from reaching a joint-wealth­
maximizing outcome on this issue. If this were true, the absence of terms 
in insurance contracts limiting insurer settlement discretion would not 
imply that such limits are joint-wealth-decreasing. Sykes considers and 
rejects several such market-failure arguments.28 
23. Sykes, supra note 6, at 1349-53. 
24. Id. at 1348. 
25. Id. at 1361-65. 
26. Id. at 1356. 
27. Sykes's article implicitly relies on a rational actor model of human behavior, a model which 
has become standard in the conventional law and economics literature. See Robert C. Ellickson, 
Bringing Culture aiid Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 
65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989) (noting that traditional law and economics analysis is based on 
the rational actor model of human behavior). For the sake of simplicity, this Comment will adopt the 
same model. 
28. Sykes, supra note 6, at 1356-61. 
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The one market-failure rationale for limits on insurer settlement 
discretion that Sykes characterizes as "plausible" involves the assumption 
that at least some insureds are poorly informed about, or do not fully 
understand, the benefits of contractual provisions limiting insurer settlement 
discretion. 29 If this assumption holds, insureds would not be willing to 
pay the increased premium necessary to compensate insurers for including 
such a term in their policies. By assumption, the insureds would not 
recognize that the additional premium would be more than offset by the 
reduction in the insureds' expected liability costs resulting from the 
restriction of the insurers' ability to reject joint-wealth-maximizing 
settlements. This argument implicitly depends on the further assumption 
that the insurance companies themselves would not, or could not, effec­
tively inform insureds of the benefits of such contractual provisions. This 
latter assumption seems plausible, given the initial assumption of ill­
informed insureds is accurate, because no single insurer would have an 
incentive to restrict its own discretion over settlement. Any insurer that 
offered such a restriction in its policies would face the threat of being 
underpriced by its competitors, given that insureds would not recognize the 
difference in the products being offered.30 
This information-cost argument is most persuasive in contexts involv­
ing classes of insureds who are likely to be relatively unsophisticated in 
commercial matters-that is, insureds who would not recognize the benefits 
of contractual limits on insurer settlement discretion. Therefore, judicially 
imposed limits on such discretion have the greatest chance of increasing the 
combined expected wealth of insurers and insureds in the context of auto­
mobile insurance or homeowners' insurance, both of which involve large 
groups of insureds who may be relatively unsophisticated in commercial 
matters and who do not typically bargain over the terms in their insurance 
contracts. In contexts involving commercially sophisticated insureds, 
however, the case for imposing limits on insurer settlement discretion is 
much weaker, because sophisticated insureds are more likely to understand 
the full benefit to them of such contractual limits and are more capable of 
negotiating the inclusion of such limits in their policies. 
This information-cost argument, if persuasive, supports the imposition 
of certain types of extracontractual restrictions on insurer settlement 
discretion in contexts involving commercially unsophisticated insureds, but 
29. Id. at 1358. 
30. See id. ("[A]n insurer who includes [such a term] in a policy will incur costs that cannot be 
recouped through higher premiums. . . • Likewise, there will be no incentive for industry associations 
to include [these terms] in their standard forms because they will recognize that, ultimately, insurers 
will not use them." (citing George A. Akerlof, The Market for •Lemons•: Qualily Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. EcoN. 488 (1970))). 
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only in those contexts.31 The argument can be summarized as follows: 
Because of the conflict of interest that arises as a result of the presence of 
policy limits and the allocation of settlement authority to the liability 
insurer, the joint gain to the insurer and the insured will sometimes be 
maximized by the inclusion in the contract of a term that limits the in­
surer's settlement discretion. Moreover, the fact that contracts between 
insurers and commercially unsophisticated insureds usually allocate unfet­
tered settlement discretion to the insurers is entirely consistent with the 
theoretical argument that contractual limits on insurer discretion are joint­
wealth-maximizing. Indeed, in such circumstances one would not expect 
to see such provisions in insurance contracts even if the provisions would 
be joint-wealth-maximizing. Therefore, to the extent one is persuaded that 
limits on insurer settlement discretion are joint-wealth-maximizing, one 
should be receptive to the suggestion that courts should imply such terms 
into insurance contracts when the terms are absent, at least in contexts 
involving unsophisticated or poorly informed insureds. 
It can also be argued that this claim finds additional support from the 
albeit scant empirical evidence that is available from insurance transactions 
involving commercially sophisticated insureds. In contracts between in­
surers and commercially sophisticated insureds, one sometimes does en­
counter restrictions on insurer settlement discretion. For example, 
physicians' professional liability policies have for decades contained 
"consent-to-settle" clauses, which typically require an insurer to get the 
insured's written consent before settling a claim that has been brought 
against the insured. 32 Similar restrictions on insurer settlement discretion 
have also become common in commercial and products liability insurance 
policies for large businesses. 33 Perhaps the better example appears in the 
3 1 .  See Syverud, supra note 9, at 1164, 1164-65 (finding "the benefits of [the) duty-to-settle 
doctrine significant in a typical personal injucy suit" in which the insured is commercially unsophis­
ticated, but noting that the "case for duty-to-settle liability weakens . . . in a context where the 
beneficiaries of the doctrine are persons who knowingly bargain over the contract terms governing 
settlement of claims"). 
32. Syverud, supra note 9, at 1175-76. 
33. Id. at 1177. Admittedly, the existence of consent-to-settle clauses demonstrates only that some 
insureds demand policy terms that protect their rights to reject settlements. It does not demonstrate that 
insureds demand policy terms that limit insurers' discretion to reject settlements. In fact, one might 
argue just the reverse: that the existence of consent-to-settle clauses plus the absence of contractual 
limits on insurer discretion to reject settlement suggests that the latter would not be joint-wealth­
maximizing. This argument is plausible, but, for several reasons, ultimately unpersuasive. First, the 
absence of disregard-the-limits clauses from liability insurance contracts could be entirely attributable 
to the existence of the duty-to-settle doctrine in the common law-there is little incentive to include 
such a term if it is by Jaw implied in evecy insurance contract. Second, if insureds and insurers think 
that imposing a disregard-the-limits requirement on insurers is joint-wealth-decreasing, why do we see 
no serious effort by the parties to contract around this requirement-that is, why are there no efforts 
to eliminate contractually the bad-faith cause of action against insurers? Sykes responds to this point 
by asserting that such a contractual provision would likely be struck down by a court as being against 
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context of reinsurance contracts between a primary insurer, who generally 
controls the settlement decision, and its reinsurer, who bears the costs of 
excess judgments. As Syverud has noted, many reinsurance contracts re­
spond to the conflict of interest that arises between the primary insurer and 
the reinsurer by placing restrictions on the primary insurer's settlement 
discretion. 34 For example, Syverud notes that excess-of-loss reinsurance 
contracts typically contain provisions requiring, among other things, "no­
tice to the reinsurer of claims threatening to exceed the retention" and 
"consultation with the reinsurer about defense strategy in such cases. "35 
Hence, there is some empirical evidence, albeit weak, suggesting that 
commercially sophisticated insurers sometimes bargain for contractual re­
strictions on insurers' discretion with respect to settlement decisions.36 
Arguably, this evidence supports the theoretical information-cost argument 
for the imposition of extracontractual limits on insurer settlement discretion 
in contexts involving commercially unsophisticated insureds. I do not want 
to overstate the importance of this "empirical evidence," however. Pro­
fessor Sykes and I agree that "inferences ... drawn from the terms of 
insurance contracts are weak inferences. "37 On the basis of the inherent 
plausibility of the information-cost theory discussed above, however, I 
would be inclined to support some limits on insurer settlement discretion 
in the limited situations described in this Comment. Sykes, however, 
examines the same theoretical arguments and some of the same empirical 
evidence and quite reasonably concludes that the argument for such 
restrictions "is, at best, uneasy. "38 It is at this point in his·argument that 
Sykes introduces the judgment-proof-insured problem, which, according to 
Sykes, further undermines arguments in favor of such limitations as the 
disregard-the-limits rule. 
public policy. Sykes, supra note 6, at 1361. Although this is a plausible possibility, Sykes has cited 
no case in which a court has struck down such a clause. Third, in situations involving highly 
sophisticated commercial actors, one does sometimes encounter certain types of contractual restrictions 
on insurer discretion to reject settlements. 
34. Syverud, supra note 9, at 1200. 
35. Id. 
36. Admittedly, the contractual provisions from the reinsurance context that Syverud describes 
are not perfectly analogous to a disregard-the-limits requirement. But those provisions arguably limit 
the primary insurer's discretion to reject settlements. Moreover, the existence of such provisions is 
especially compelling evidence of the preferences of commercially sophisticated parties, given that in 
the reinsurance context, the duty-to-settle doctrine is virtually nonexistent. It is precisely in the 
reinsurance context, therefore, in which one might expect such a contractual limitation to appear if it 
were joint-wealth-maximizing. 
37. Sykes, supra note 6, at 1361 . 
38. Id. at 1348. 
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ill. The Judgment-Proof-Insured Problem 
Under Sykes's view, the existence of judgment-proof insureds creates 
at least two problems for the disregard-the-limits rule. First, in a world 
with judgment-proof insureds, the disregard-the-limits rule will sometimes 
give insurers an incentive to accept joint-wealth-decreasing settlement 
demands. 39 Second, under those circumstances, liability insureds may re­
spond by underconsuming liability insurance coverage, thereby externaliz­
ing additional accident costs onto tort victims.40 Thus, Sykes strongly 
suggests that the judgment-proof-insured problem further undermines any 
argument in support of imposing the disregard-the-limits rule.41 Part ill 
describes this problem and suggests an alternative approach to the 
disregard-the-limits rule that offers a potential solution. 
The judgment-proof-insured problem is essentially this: Under certain 
circumstances involving judgment-proof insureds, the disregard-the-limits 
rule-as it is applied in the majority of states-will induce the insurer, 
under certain circumstances, to accept joint-wealth-decreasing settlement 
demands. This result can be seen through our example. Recall that the 
insured in the example faces a 50 % probability of a $100,000 tort judg­
ment, and the policy limit is $50,000. Previously we assumed that if the 
tort suit resulted in a $100,000 judgment at trial, the insured would have 
sufficient assets to cover the $50,000 excess judgment. Now assume that 
the insured has only $10,000 of available assets-that is, $10,000 of assets 
available to satisfy a judgment in excess of the policy limits. Therefore, 
the insured is judgment-proof with respect to any judgment in excess of 
$60,000. Under these assumptions, although the expected trial judgment 
is $50,000, the expected payment to the plaintiff-that is, the expected 
enforceable judgment is only $30,000.42 Note that under these circum­
stances and applying the traditional disregard-the-limits rule, the insurer 
would have an incentive to accept any settlement demand less than 
$50,000. Why? Because, as the disregard-the-limits rule has traditionally 
been applied, and is currently applied in a majority of states,43 both the 
liability trigger and the amount of damages are calculated in a manner that 
iguores the value of the insured's available assets. 
To see the· effect of the traditional disregard-the-limits rule, assume 
that the insurer in our example were to reject a $40,000 settlement demand 
and the case were to result in a $100,000 trial judgment against the 
39. Id. at 1361-65. 
40. Id. at 1365. 
41. Id. 
42. The $30,000 expected payment is the product of the 50 % chance that the court would find for 
the plaintiff and the total value of the assets available to satisfy the judgment-which includes the 
$50,000policy limit and the insured's $10,000 in assets. 
43. See infra note 56. 
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insured. The insurer (1) would be liable to the tort plaintiff for the 
$50,000 policy limit; and (2) following a duty-to-settle suit, would be liable 
to the insured, or the insured's assignee, for the full $50,000 excess judg­
ment, irrespective of the fact that the insured had only $10,000 of available 
assets. Thus, although the expected payment to the plaintiff at the time of 
the settlement demand is $30,000, the expected cost to the insurer of 
rejecting any settlement demand and going to trial would be $50,000. 
The problem with this outcome is that, under the assumptions of the 
example, a $50,000 settlement-or any settlement greater than $30,000-
decreases the combined expected wealth of the insurer and the insured. To 
see why, note that the insurer and the insured could have rewritten the 
contract ex ante to increase their joint returns from the transaction. In 
return for a lower premium, the insured would have been willing to limit 
the amount that it could recover from the insurer in a duty-to-settle cause 
of action. In theory, the insured would have been willing to reduce its 
maximum potential duty-to-settle award to the difference between the 
policy limits and the value of the insured's available assets. In turn, the 
insurer would have been willing to offer the insured the desired premium 
reduction in return for a limit on its potential duty-to-settle liability. 
Sykes discusses the theoretical possibility of such a Coasean bargain, 
but he suggests that such bargains would never occur in practice because 
such agreements cannot be enforced in court.44 Courts, according to 
Sykes, will not allow insureds to waive their right to bring a bad faith 
cause of action.45 In any event, Sykes regards a contractual solution to 
the judgment-proof-insured problem as too costly for the parties to negoti­
ate.46 For both of these reasons, Sykes concludes that the application of 
the traditional disregard-the-limits rule in a world with judgment-proof 
insureds will probably cause insurers to accept some joint-wealth­
decreasing settlement demands.47 
Sykes argues further that one judgment-proof-insured problem may 
lead to another. In response to liability insurers' increased tendency to 
accept joint-wealth-decreasing settlement demands-induced by the applica­
tion of the disregard-the-limits rule-liability insureds may have an 
incentive to reduce their policy limits and, in effect, to underconsume 
liability insurance.48 Insureds would reduce their policy limits because. 
44. Sykes, supra note 6, at 1362-63. 
45. Id. at 1360. 
46. Id. at 1363. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1364. Sykes formally proves this point in another recent paper, but this argument, by 
Sykes's own admission, requires a number of strong assumptions. Sykes, supra note 7, at 100-07. 
But see Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand/or liability Insurance, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1629, 1640-46 
(1994) (arguing that, in part because of incentives facing plaintiffs' lawyers and liability insurance 
companies, the tort system results in overconsumption of liability insurance). 
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by doing so, they could induce plaintiffs to make lower settlement 
demands. Under the assumptions of Sykes's model, this strategy works for 
the following reason: Because a plaintiff's expected return from litigating 
a case decreases as the amount of the judgment that is potentially 
uncollectible increases, the plaintiff's settlement demand is a function of the 
policy limits in the defendant's liability insurance policy, assuming the 
insured is judgment proof. And to the extent that the disregard-the-limits 
rule causes insureds to underconsume insurance, it can shift costs onto tort 
victims.49 
Taking into account both of these problems associated with the 
existence of judgment-proof insureds-the tendency of insurers to accept 
joint-wealth-decreasing settlements and the tendency of insureds to respond 
by underconsuming liability insurance-Sykes concludes that "the case for 
the disregard-the-limits rule-or any other simple rule that one might 
imagine-weakens greatly. "50 
IV. Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem: The Michigan Rule 
There is a simple variation of the traditional disregard-the-limits rule 
that takes into account the existence of judgment-proof insureds and that 
may eliminate both of the judgment-proof problems that Sykes identifies. 
The proposal is this: Limit the amount of an insurer's potential duty-to­
settle damages to the difference between the policy limit, which the insurer 
has presumably already paid out, and the value of the insured's available 
assets. In addition, the duty-to-settle liability rule itself could be designed 
so that liability is triggered only if the insurer rejects a settlement demand 
that is less than the expected enforceable judgment. If applied perfectly by 
courts, this rule would give insurers an incentive to make only joint-wealth­
increasing settlement decisions. They would accept settlements that 
increase-and reject settlements that decrease-the combined expected 
wealth of themselves and their insureds. Also, because insurers under this 
rule would no longer have an incentive to accept joint-wealth-decreasing 
settlements, the insureds' incentive to underconsume liability insurance 
would likewise disappear. To that extent, this rule would lessen the cost­
externalization effect of the judgment-proof problem that Sykes mentions. 
Note that this proposal essentially reflects the outcome that insurers and 
insureds would reach by Coasean contract if the law permitted. Therefore, 
49. Sykes, supra note 6, at 1364. In this part of his paper, Sykes begins to consider policy 
objectives other than the maximization of the combined expected wealth of liability insurers and their 
insureds. See also Sykes, supra note 7, at 79 ("A case for an extracontractual obligation on the insurer 
might somehow rest on the presence of externalities to the contract, but the courts do not offer this 
rationale." (footnote omitted)). For a more thorough discussion of how duty-to-settle rules can affect 
the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law, see infra Part V. 
50. Id. at 1365. 
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one alternative to this proposal would be simply to allow insureds to limit 
their duty-to-settle remedy against the insurer contractually. However, to 
the extent one believes that information costs or other market failures are 
present, one might think that those same concerns would prevent the parties 
from reaching this contractual solution. 
This alternative form of the disregard-the-limits rule is not merely a 
theoretical possibility. A version of it was recently adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Michigan in a case involving a bad faith claim brought 
by an insured against her liability insurer. si In Frankenmuth Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Keeley, the insured, who was also the tort-defendant in 
the prior action, alleged that her liability insurer, by rejecting a reasonable 
settlement demand, had caused the tort case to go to trial, which resulted 
in a judgment against the insured. The insured sought damages equal to 
the difference between the policy limit and the amount of the tort judg­
ment, although the value of the insured's available assets was considerably 
less than the amount of the judgment. One of the issues in the bad faith 
ease was whether the insured's duty-to-settle damages should be limited to 
the difference between the policy limit and the value of the insured's 
available assets plus the assets that the insured had reasonable prospects of 
acquiring in the near future. sz On rehearing, the court held that duty-to­
settle damages should be so limited and that therefore the insured should 
not be allowed to recover the full amount of the tort judgment. The court 
based this deeision on the theory that (1) the duty-to-settle remedy should 
equal the harm; and (2) the insured was harmed only to the extent of her 
available and soon-to-be-available assets.s3 Although this approach has 
been dubbed the "Michigan Rule, "54 this alternative version of the 
disregard-the-limits rule has been suggested by commentators for many 
years. ss Nevertheless, the majority of courts have rejected this approach 
and have instead held that the value of the insured's available assets should 
be ignored for the purpose of determining duty-to-settle damages. s6 
51. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 461 N.W.2d 666, 667 (Mich. 1990) (adopting the 
dissent of Levin, J ., in Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 447 N. W.2d 691, 707-09 (Mich. 1989), 
rev'd on rehearing and remanded, 462 N.W.2d 750 (Mich. 1990)). 
52. Frankenmuth, 447 N.W.2d at 707- 08. 
53. Frankenmuth, 461 N.W.2d at 667. 
54. Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y v. Evans, 622 A.2d 103, 114 (Md. 1993). 
SS. Victor E. Schwartz, Statutory Strict liability for an /11Surer's Failure to Settle: A Balanced 
Plan for an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DUKE LJ. 901, 913-14, 917-18 (proposing a statutory duty-to­
settle scheme whereby insurers would be liable for either the full amount of the judgment or the value 
of the insured's assets, whichever is smaller); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 8, § 7 .8(i)(4), at 903-04 
(proposing a similar limit on the insurer's duty-to-settle liability); Syverud, supra note 9, at 1169 n.145 
("In theory, the liability of the insurance company for a judgment in excess of the policy limits should 
be limited to the total assets of the insured, because the insured could lose no more than those assets 
in paying a final judgment."). 
56. See Medical Mm., 622 A.2d at 114, 114-15 (collecting cases applying the "majority rule" that 
the "measure of damages in a bad faith failure to settle case is the amount by which the judgment 
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The spirit of the Michigan Rule could be implemented either through 
a negligence duty-to-settle rule or through a strict-liability duty-to-settle 
rule. Under the negligence approach to the duty-to-settle question, the 
court-jury, judge, or other factfinder-would attempt, from an ex post 
perspective, to determine the reasonableness of the insurer's ex ante 
decision to reject the settlement demand. If the Michigan Rule were 
implemented through such a negligence approach, the court could ask 
whether the settlement demand that the insurer rejected was, at the time of 
the rejection, less than the value of the expected enforceable judgment. 
Under a strict-liability version of the Michigan Rule, if the insurer were to 
reject a settlement demand within the policy limits and the plaintiff were 
to win a judgment in excess of those limits, the insured would automati­
cally be allowed to recover from the insurer the difference between the 
policy limit and the insured's available assets-limited, of course, by the 
amount of the judgment. 57 
Although all the courts that have adopted a duty-to-settle rule have 
used the negligence approach,58 both the negligence approach and the 
strict-liability approaches have costs and benefits. Perhaps the most serious 
complaint that can be made about the negligence approach is that the 
court's ex post analysis of the insurer's ex ante settlement decision may be 
subject to certain types of systematic biases. For example, one might 
argue that jurors placed in the position of deciding this question would 
have a tendency to favor the plaintiff over the insurance company. This 
complaint, of course, would apply not only to the negligence rule proposed 
in this Comment, but also to any duty-to-settle rule that requires a court to 
undertake the negligence or reasonableness analysis. The complication that 
this Comment's proposal would add to the traditional negligence analysis 
is the problem of valuing the insured's available assets. This additional 
variable could prove quite burdensome for courts.59 
rendered in the underlying action exceeds the amount of the insurance coverage"); see also PAT 
MAGARICK, ExcESS LIABILITY§ 15.07 (3d ed. 1 989) (noting the majority rule against requiring a duty­
to-settle plaintiff to prove evidence that the insured could in fact pay the judgment); Syverud, supra 
note 9, at 1 1 69 n. 145 (citing cases that apply the majority rule). 
57. Note that in Frankenmuth, the court seemed to apply the traditional negligence trigger and then 
to limit the damages to the difference between the policy limit and the insured's available assets. 
Frankenmuth, 461 N.W.2d at 667 . 
58. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 586 (1990) ("No court has 
squarely adopted the strict liability test . . . .  "). 
59. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 8, § 7. S(i)(I), at 899-900 (noting the "considerable 
uncertainty [that would exist] in regard to predicting whether the insured may ultimately have resources 
or assets that may be taken to satisfy some portion of the judgment"). Another difficult question raised 
by my proposal is whether, in calculating the value of the insured's available assets, the value of the 
insured's right to bring the duty-to-settle claim against the insurer should be included. Often this right 
will be the most valuable asset the insured has when the judgment is rendered against it. The benefits 
of introducing this complication into the analysis, which are unclear, would likely be overwhelmed by 
1994] Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem 1389 
One factor that might favor a strict-liability approach to implementing 
this Comment's proposal is the reduction of juror discretion. If one 
believed that jurors were, for whatever reason, biased in one direction or 
another, it might be desirable to limit jurors' discretion by eliminating the 
ex post reasonableness analysis of the insurer's settlement decisions. ro 
Another argument often made on behalf of the strict-liability approach is 
that it would reduce the costs of administering the duty-to-settle rule. 
However, although the administrative costs associated with any single 
strict-liability suit might be lower than under the negligence approach, 
under the strict-liability rule there likely would be more suits brought. 
Whether the "cost-per-case effect" would dominate the "quantity effect" 
is unclear.61 
One might oppose a strict-liability duty-to-settle rule on the theory that 
such a rule would undermine the usefulness of coverage limits in insurance 
policies. This is because, under a rule that creates a potential duty-to-settle 
cause of action whenever an insurer rejects a settlement demand within the 
policy limit, the tort-plaintiff would have an incentive to make a relatively 
high settlement demand, one that the insurer would be likely to reject. 
Under this strategy, if the tort-plaintiff were ultimately to win a judgment 
against the tort-defendant, the liability insurer would be responsible for the 
full amount of the judgment and not merely for the amount of the policy 
limits. Note, however, that the Michigan Rule would mitigate this effect 
to some extent, because the maximum liability of the insurer would be 
limited by the value of the insured's available assets, which will sometimes 
be less than the policy limits. Also, under the strict-liability approach, 
arriving at a value for the insured's assets would be less of a problem than 
under the negligence approach, because under the strict-liability approach 
the value need only be determined ex post. Unlike the negligence ap­
proach, the strict-liability approach would not ask the factfinder to 
the costs. For instsnce, including the value of the duty-to-settle claim in the insured's assets could 
create new conflicts of interest between the insurer and the insured and new opportunities for bargaining 
strategies between the insurer and the plaintiff. See id. § 7.8(i)(4), at 903 (recommending that, when 
calculating the value of the insured's available assets for the purpose of determining the appropriate 
duty-to-settle damage award, the value to the insured of the duty-to-settle claim should not be includ� 
60. This argument depends on the assumption that eliminating the reasonableness inquiry would 
in fact reduce juror discretion. 
61. See POSNER, supra note S, at 560-61 (noting that under a strict-liability rule, the savings 
gained from simplifying the issues in individual tort cases could be off-set by the costs from increasing 
the number of claims likely to be brought once the scope of liability is expanded); STEVEN SHAVELL, 
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW§ 11.1.3 (1987) (noting that a comparison of administrative 
costs under strict liability and negligence "is ambiguous as a theoretical matter"); Steven P. Croley & 
Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products 
Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14-17 (1991) (noting the shortcomings of past analyses that have 
attempted to demonstrate that a strict-liability approach is demonstrably more costly than a negligence 
approach). 
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determine what the estimated value of the insured's assets would have been 
at the time the settlement decision was made and what, at that time, the 
value of those assets was expected to be in the future. 62 
V. Comparing the Effects of the Michigan Rule and the Majority Rule on 
the Deterrence and Insurance Goals 
This Comment has advanced two propositions: First, although the 
empirical evidence is inconclusive, there is a plausible theoretical argument 
for imposing some type of extracontractual limit on liability insurers' 
discretion to settle claims against th�ir insureds, at least in circumstances 
involving commercially unsophisticated insureds. Second, if the previous 
proposition is accepted, there is also an argument that this extracontractual 
limit should be tailored to take into account explicitly the existence of 
judgment-proof insureds. Accordingly, insurers' liability under such a rule 
should be limited to the difference between the policy limits and the value 
of the insured's available assets: This limit could take the form of a 
negligence rule, a strict-liability rule, or a variation of either. 
It also has been assumed thus far that, in designing background rules 
to govern the settlement decisions of liability insurance companies, the 
only, or at least the dominant, normative criterion is the encouragement of 
insurer settlement decisions that maximize the combined expected wealth 
of the parties to the contract-the insurer and the insured. Thus, the 
effects on third parties of settlement decisions and the rules governing 
settlement decisions have both been largely ignored. Now consider how 
the analysis becomes more complicated if one tries to take into account the 
effects of these rules on a specific group of third parties, namely, tort 
victims. To that end, this Part addresses what the optimal settlement 
amount should be in terms of the deterrence and insurance goals of tort 
law. It then briefly examines how the two duty-to-settle rules-the 
majority rule and the Michigan Rule-compare in their respective ten­
dencies to further those goals. It should be emphasized that this Comment 
does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of either of these questions. It 
merely suggests potentially fruitful areas of further inquiry. 
62. For a useful summary of the costs and benefits of various strict-liability approaches to the 
duty-to-settle question, see ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 1 93-95. Syverud has proposed a modified 
version of the strict-liability rule that would eliminate some of the problems discussed in the text. 
Under his proposal, "[c]ourts could hinge strict liability not upon rejection of a plaintiff's demand, but 
rather upon refusal to offer what a neutral arbitrator, mediator, or settlement judge estimates is the 
value of the claim." Syverud, supra note 9, at 1170. That proposal would avoid some of the 
administrative costs of the negligence and the pure strict-liability approaches. Moreover, a well-chosen 
arbitrator or mediator msy be less biased against insurers than the average juror is likely to be. This 
Comment's proposal-to take into account the value of the insured's available assets in determining 
duty-to-settle liability or damages-is consistent with Syverud's approach. 
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Legal economists generally agree that the principal economic goals of 
tort law are deterrence and insurance. 63 The deterrence goal of tort law 
is to give tortfeasors and victims the incentive to prevent all cost-justifiably 
preventable accidents-that is, all accidents that can be prevented at a cost 
less than the expected accident cost. The deterrence goal is satisfied when 
all parties bear the full, expected costs of the accidents they cause. The 
insurance goal, sometimes called the compensation goal, is to spread effi­
ciently the risks of accidents that cannot cost-justifiably be prevented. 64 
Taking into account the goals of tort law, it might be possible to 
identify the optimal settlement decision with respect to any given tortfeasor 
and victim. That is, it might be possible to identify the circumstances in 
which the optimal result would be either settlement or litigation. More­
over, when settlement is preferable to litigation, it might be possible to 
determine what the optimal settlement amount, or the range of efficient 
settlement amounts, should be. Such a project is well beyond the scope of 
this Comment. However, under the highly stylized assumptions of our 
example, it can be said that the optimal settlement decision is either (1) a 
settlement precisely equal to the expected trial judgment; or (2) the 
decision to go to trial. 
Once more, recall the assumptions: A plaintiff who suffered $100,000 
in damages sues the insured in tort for that amount. All parties agree that 
there is a fifty percent chance that the court will either hold the insured 
liable for the full amount or leave the losses on the plaintiff. The insured 
has $50,000 of liability insurance coverage and $10,000 in available assets, 
and the insurance policy allocates settlement discretion to the insurer. 
Under the assumptions of this example, the optimal settlement, from the 
point of view of deterrence and insurance, would be precisely equal to the 
expected trial judgment of $50,000. This is because, under the current 
assumptions, requiring the insured-or the insurer, if the insurance pre­
miums are perfectly experience-rated-to pay the expected value of the trial 
judgment fully internalizes the accident costs to the insured and fully 
compensates the injured plaintiff. This result follows because, in a 
probabilistic sense, the expected value of the trial judgment under these 
assumptions is precisely equal to the expected value of the plaintiff's 
damages that the insured caused. 
This argument is an application of the concept of probabilistic 
causation, which has been applied, among other places, in the mass torts 
literature. In the most general terms, this concept suggests that, in 
63. E.g. , John E. Calfee & Clifford Winston, Economic Aspects of Liability Rules and Liability 
Insurance, in LIABILITY: PERsPECTIVES AND POLICY 16, 16-18 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston 
eds., 1988); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, '!he First-Party Insurance Extemality: An Economic 
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 129, 135 (1990). 
64. Calfee & Winston, supra note 63, at 16-18; Hanson & Logue, supra note 63, at 135. 
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circumstances involving uncertainty about whether a particular tortfeasor 
caused a harm, an efficient response can be-under strong assumptions-to 
impose liability and award damages equal to the expected value of the 
harm. 65 This Comment argues that the same principle can be applied to 
the uncertainty over whether a court will determine that the insured is 
liable for those injuries. 66 Therefore, based on the foregoing argument, 
one might contend that an optimal duty-to-settle rule would have a tendency 
to result in such settlements that approximate the expected trial judgment. 
Now consider the extent to which the Michigan Rule and the majority 
rule have a tendency to achieve this result. If we maintain the assumptions 
of our example, it can be shown that the Michigan Rule, either in the form 
of a negligence rule or a strict-liability rule, will have a tendency to 
encourage settlements that either underdeter accidents and underinsure tort 
victims or will result in the case going to trial. The Michigan Rule would 
lead to litigation: First, the insurer would not accept any settlement greater 
than $30,000, because the insurer's expected cost of going to trial is only 
$30,000. 67 Second, the plaintiff would accept nothing less than $50,000, 
which is the plaintiff's expected benefit of going to trial. Under the 
majority rule, however, there would be a tendency for the parties to settle 
and for settlements to approach the expected trial judgment. This is 
because the insurer would be willing to pay $50,000-its expected cost of 
going to trial-but would be unwilling to pay more. The insured, on the 
other hand, would be unwilling to take any less. Interestingly, however, 
under a negligence version of the majority rule, the insured would have an 
incentive to contribute to the settlement negotiations an amount up to 
$500068 for a total possible settlement of $55,000. Under a strict-liability 
version of the majority rule, however, the insured would not be willing to 
contribute anything, as its expected cost of going to trial would be zero. 
Therefore, although a negligence version of the majority rule might result 
in settlements that provide excess deterrence and insurance-that is, 
settlements greater than the amount of the expected trial judgment-a strict­
liability version of that rule would lead to settlements that approach the 
optimal amount. Obviously, if the assumptions of the example are relaxed, 
65. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A •Public Law# Vision 
of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 859-60 (1984); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation 
and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 783-89 (1985); Shavell, supra note 6 1 ,  
§ 5.3.2-.3. 
66. This final claim depends on the assumption that the court will be applying the efficient liability 
rule and that the court's decision is not biased in any direction. 
67. Recall that $30,000 is the product of (1) the 50% chance that the plaintiff will recover; and 
(2) the sum of the amounts the plaintiff would recover from the insurer-the $50,000 policy limit and 
the insured-the $10,000 in available assets-if the plaintiff wins the case. 
68. The $5000 is the insured's expected cost of going to trial-the product of the plaintiff's 50% 
chance of recoveiy and the insured's $10,000 in available assets. 
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we might reach different conclusions with respect to the Michigan Rule and 
the majority rule. For example, if we were to assume that insurers and 
insureds have asymmetrical assessments of the likely trial outcome or 
asymmetrical tolerance for risk, the conclusions could change. 
Moreover, even under the strong assumptions of our example, it is un­
clear whether the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law would be 
better served under the majority rule or the Michigan Rule. It may be that 
settlement decisions under the majority rule, at least a strict-liability 
- version of the majority rule, have a greater likelihood of furthering deter­
rence and insurance goals than do settlement decisions under the Michigan 
Rule. However, under the majority rule, the insurance market would 
likely respond in a way that would actually increase the judgment-proof­
insured problem. This argument goes as follows: The effect of the major­
ity rule is essentially to eliminate the effect of policy limits-that is, the 
majority rule makes the insurer potentially liable for the full amount of any 
trial judgment against its insureds. One of the benefits of policy limits is 
to combat adverse selection. 69 Therefore, under the majority rule, in­
surers would have greater difficulty combatting adverse selection than they 
would under the Michigan Rule, which would lead to higher premiums and 
perhaps lower coverage for some liability insureds. Moreover, as pre­
miums increased under such a rule-owing to adverse selection-some 
tortfeasors at the margin would be priced out of the insurance market 
altogether. With fewer tortfeasors purchasing liability insurance because 
of this effect, the beneficial deterrence and insurance effects of liability 
insurance would be diminished. 70 
In sum, whether the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law are 
better served by the majority rule or the Michigan Rule remains an 
empirical question. Indeed, the principal contribution of this Part of the 
Comment has been to hint at the complexity that one must consider in 
order to identify the "optimal" background rule to govern settlement 
decisions, if one opens the analysis to include normative criteria other than 
69. ABRAHAM, supra note 58, at 4. Adverse selection is the tendency of a party that faces a 
higher-than-average level of risk to have a greater demand for insurance than a party that presents a 
relatively low level of risk. Because a potential policyholder has better information about its risk of 
loss than the insurer has, the process of adverse selection forces the insurer to raise premiums and to 
set policy limits on the losses it will cover. Id. at 3-4. 
70. As a result of this adverse selection under the majority rule, there would also be a general 
increase in the amount of risk borne by risk averse individuals, who, under the Michigan Rule, would 
have purchased insurance. That fact alone is a reason to be concerned about the majority rule. 
SHAVELL, supra note 61 , § 8 . 1 .4, at 192 ("It should also be emphasized that the allocation of risk is 
in principle just as important a determinant of social welfare as the . • •  reduction of accident losses."). 
Sykes, in another recent article, shows that insureds may respond to the existence of the majority 
version of the disregard-the-limits rule ex ante by lowering the policy limits in the insurance they buy. 
Sykes, supra note 7, at I 03. This result would also exacerbate the judgment-proof problem. 
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maximizing the combined expected wealth of the parties to the contract. 
However, to the extent one wants to limit the analysis to the joint-wealth­
maximization criterion, there is a plausible argument for using the 
Michigan Rule, in contexts involving unsophisticated insureds, because of 
its ability to respond to the judgment-proof-insured problem. 
VI. Conclusion 
Consider the following question: Would any of the judgment-proof 
problems discussed in this Comment and in Sykes's paper remain if Con­
gress enacted a regime of universal, unlimited, mandatory liability 
insurance? This regime would entail liability insurance that (1) has no 
policy limits, deductibles, or exclusions; (2) covers the risks of any tort 
judgment; and (3) must be purchased by everyone. What would the bene­
fits of such a regime be? To the extent liability insurers can monitor their 
insureds and encourage them to take appropriate accident-avoidance 
measures-in return for premium breaks through feature or experience 
rating-tortfeasors would be given the appropriate incentive to prevent 
accidents. In addition, no tort victim would go uncompensated. More­
over, under this regime, unlike under the majority rule discussed in this 
Comment, there would be no adverse selection. After all, the regime 
would be both mandatory and universal. 
Obviously, such a regime, at least the extreme version hypothesized 
here, would entail enormous potential costs. If, however, we treat this 
extreme version of universal, unlimited, mandatory liability coverage as 
our conceptual starting point, perhaps we will stumble upon a more realis­
tic proposal for liability-insurance reform that would address the judgment­
proof problems that undermine the goals of tort law and of insurance law. 
In any event, such a conceptual approach would inevitably improve our 
understanding of the largely nonuniversal. limited, and optional regime of 
liability insurance that we now have. 
